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Building Vulnerability Design Against Terrorist Attacks 
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Attacks against buildings using a stationary or moving vehicle laden with large amount of explosive 
have become the weapon of choice by some terrorist groups. Structural engineers today face a new 
challenge and require methods and guidance on how to design structures to resist various hostile 
acts. 
 
Table 1 summarises some recent terrorist attacks on civilian buildings with bombs of variable 
magnitudes and their methods of delivery. The devastating attack against the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995, the collapse of both WTC Towers in New York 
in September 2001, the tragic events in Bali in October 2002, and the most recent bombing of the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004 have underscored the attractiveness and 
vulnerability of civilian buildings as terrorist targets. These attacks have also demonstrated that 
modern terrorism should not be regarded as something that could happen elsewhere. Any nation can 
no longer believe themselves immune to terrorist violence within their own borders. The fact is that 
the majority of government and civilian buildings continue to be vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  
 






Australian Embassy, Jakarta, 
Indonesia 
Moving van 
loaded with HE 150 kg 
November, 
2003 
HSBC Bank, Istanbul, Turkey Moving vehicle 
150 kg 
May, 2003 Housing Compounds, Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia 
Three cars 
loaded with HE Not available 
October, 2002 Sari Club Bombing, Bali, 
Indonesia 
Car bomb in 
front of building 










June, 1996 US Military Complex, The 
Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia 
Truck bomb 
2000 kg 
April, 1995 Murrah Building, Oklahoma 
City, USA 
Stationary truck 




Table 1. Selected recent terrorist attacks with high explosives 
 
This paper aims to introduce concepts that can help structural engineers and building owners 
mitigate the threat of hazards associated with terrorist attacks on new and existing buildings. While 
the issue of blast-hardening of structures has been an active topic with the military services, the 
relevant design documents are restricted to official use only. A very limited body of design 
documentation exists currently to provide engineers with the technical data necessary to design civil 
structures for enhanced physical security. The professional skills required to provide blast resistant 
consulting services include structural dynamics, knowledge of the physical properties of explosive 
detonations and general knowledge of physical security practices. 
 
Designing security into a building requires a complex series of trade-offs. Physical security 
measures need to be balanced with many other design requirements such as fire protection, energy 
efficiency, natural hazard mitigation, accessibility, and aesthetics. Because the probability of 
terrorist attack against a specific target building is very small, security measures should not 
interfere with daily operations of the building. On the other hand, because the effects of terrorist 
attack could be catastrophic, it is prudent to incorporate measures that may save lives and minimise 
business interruption in the unlikely event of an attack. Security design measures should be part of 
an overall multi-hazard approach to ensure that the building behaviour in the far more likely event 
of a fire, earthquake, or hurricane, is not worsened by the introduction of the security specific 
measures. 
 
The primary objective of protecting office buildings against terrorist attack is to save lives with the 
focus on a damage-limiting or damage-mitigating approach rather than a blast-resistant approach. 
This can be achieved by incorporating some reasonable measures that will enhance the life safety of 
the persons inside the building and facilitate rescue efforts in the unlikely event of terrorist attack. 
Structurally this could be accomplished by preventing catastrophic collapse of the building to 
reduce the number of building occupants that become trapped under the structural debris. 
Maintaining structural integrity of the building can also help protect occupants from the flying 
debris and air-blast pressure of an explosion. 
 
Better understanding what an explosion is and what it can do to a building are necessary for 
developing physical security measures which are effective in mitigating the effects of a terrorist 
attack. This paper reviews the general properties of a bomb blast, the concept of defence in depth 
for an urban planning layout, the blast barriers, and preventing progressive collapse of a structure. 
This paper will also discuss current state-of-the-art methods to enhance protection of the building 
by incorporating low-cost measures into new buildings at the early stages of design. 
 
 
2. Explosion effects 
 
An explosion is the rapid release of stored energy. This energy is released in part as thermal 
radiation; the rest manifesting as shock waves that are combinations of air blast and ground shock. 
The air blast is the main damage mechanism. Air blast has a primary effect, which is an ambient 
over-pressure or incident pressure, and a secondary effect, which is the dynamic pressure or drag 
load. The first effect is caused by the air blast that propagates at supersonic velocity, and 
compresses air molecules in its path. As the shock wave encounters a rigid object (e.g. a building 
wall), it is reflected thus amplifying the over-pressure by some significant factor between two and 
up to thirteen. The air blast enters the building through wall openings and failed doors and 
windows, affecting floor slabs, partitions, and content within the building. The shock waves 
undergo diffraction as they interact with various surfaces, thus increasing or decreasing in pressure. 
Eventually, the air blast subjects the entire building to over-pressure. 
 
The pressures decay exponentially in time and with radial distance from the epicentre, measured 
typically in several milliseconds. Diffraction effects, caused by building features such as re-entrant 
corners may act to confine the air blast, prolonging its duration. Eventually, the shock wave 
becomes negative, creating suction forces. Following the vacuum, air rushes in, creating dynamic 
pressure or drag loading which manifests as a high velocity wind that propels debris generated by 
the blast. In case of an external explosion, a portion of the energy is also imparted to the ground, 
creating a crater and generating the ground shock that produces motions similar to high-intensity, 




Figure 1   Air-blast pressure time history and blast wave parameters 
 
The following effects are characterised from a blast wave (see Figure 1): 
• Magnitude of the overpressure or the peak pressure during the over-pressure phase of the blast 
wave (Pso is the peak incident overpressure; and Pr is the peak reflected over-pressure). 
• Impulse or duration of the over-pressure. Impulse is the area under the over-pressure time 
history curve. Positive phase duration, t0, measures how long the over-pressure phase of the 
blast wave lasts. 
• Shape of the over-pressure pulse. Military high explosives will typically have a very high 
shock value with near-zero rise-time, which then decays rapidly. 
 
The peak blast pressure is a function of the weapon size and the cube of the distance called the 
standoff. For an explosive threat defined by its charge weight and standoff, the peak incident and 
reflected pressures and other blast wave parameters such as the incident and reflected impulse are 
evaluated using charts available in military technical manuals or using specialised computer 
programs such as CONWEP (Hyde, 1992). 
 
2.1 Equivalent explosive weight 
 
The charge weight of the explosive is typically measured in the net equivalent weight of TNT, as 
TNT is used as the standard explosive in assessing blast effects. The most common home-made 
type of explosive is fertiliser-fuel mixture or Ammonia Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO). ANFO’s average 
equivalent weight factor to TNT is 0.82, or 82 percent the blasting power by equivalent weight in 
TNT. Typical defensive design is for a vehicle laden with anywhere from 25kg to 2000kg of 
explosive. For reference the explosive weight of the standard hand grenade has about 0.3-0.4kg and 
the average sized ordnance deployed by aircraft during operation Desert Storm was about 500kg 
“bunker busters”. 
 
2.2 Blast loading 
 
The key aspect of structural design to resist blast effects and progressive collapse is determining the 
nature and magnitude of the blast loading. This involves assessing the amount and type of 
explosive, as well as its distance from the building. Another factor is the level of security that can 
be placed around and within the building. The blast threat may include a package bomb, a suitcase 
bomb, vehicle-borne bomb, or some other means of delivery. The type of explosive is an important 
factor because all explosives behave differently. Moreover, some types of explosives are easier to 
obtain than others. 
 
The overall effect of an explosion may be quantified by its charge weight, W, measured in 
equivalent weight of TNT, and its distance from the building, or the standoff, R. The peak pressure 
is a function of distance R divided by the cube root of the charge weight W. This is commonly 
called and expressed as Scaled Distance = R / W1/3.  Another way of viewing scaled distance and 
pressure relationship is by Peak Pressure ∼ W / R3. This means that by doubling the standoff the 
incident pressure is reduced by a factor of eight for a given weapon. This gives an indication of how 
the damage to a building can be mitigated most effectively: keep large weapons as far from the 
building as we possibly can. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the above relationship between explosive weight and standoff distance with four 
incident pressure curves (5.0, 10.0, 20.0, 50.0 kPa). By entering the x-axis with the estimated 
weight of explosive and the y-axis with a known standoff distance, the resultant effects of 
overpressure could be determined. The vehicle symbols at the top of Figure 2 display the relative 




Figure 2   Incident pressure as a function of distance and explosive weight 
 
2.2.1 Example: blast load on building facade 
 
In this sample problem, an explosive device consists of 100 kg TNT and is located in a street 15 
metres from a single office block. The blast load will be assessed in application to a double glazed 
unit 1.5m wide by 2m high with its centre 12m above the ground. It is required to determine peak 
reflected overpressure and reflected impulse for a point of interest on front elevation of office block 
(see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3   Geometry of an office block used for 3-D numerical simulation. 
 
Step 1. Charge weight W = 100 kg of TNT (hemispherical charge), h = 12m, and RG = 15m. 
Step 2. For the point of interest: 
( )1 22 2
min1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
1 1
15 12 19.2 m
19.2 m m4.1 1.2
100 kg kg
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Step 3. Determine reflected blast wave parameters for Zh = 4.1 m/kg1/3. From TM5-1300 (US 
Army, 1991): 
Pr = 146 kPa 
ir/W1/3= 154 kPa-msec/kg1/3;  ir = 154x(100)1/3 = 715 kPa-msec  
t0/W1/3 = 4.05 msec/kg1/3;  t0 = 4.05x(100)1/3 = 18.7 msec 
If the peak load on a glazing unit is required for design purposes, the panel load is calculated as: 
 Load = 146kPa x 1.5m x 2.0m = 438 kN 
 Impulse = 715 kPa-msec x (1.5m x 2.0m)  = 2145 kN-msec 
 
2.3 Predicting damage to a building 
 
Airblast pressures are usually several orders of magnitude greater than the loads for which the 
building is designed. Fortunately, these only act for a fraction of a second on the building. It is 
because of the short duration of the loading that is possible to design structures to withstand blast 
loads. The extent and severity of damage and injuries in an explosive event cannot be predicted 
with high degree of certainty. Past events show that the overall level of damage can be influenced 
by the specific type of construction, the arrangement of buildings and their heights, the size of the 
structure, the presence of fragment loading, and other factors. Despite these uncertainties, it is 
possible to predict the expected extent of damage for a specific explosive event based on the size of 
the explosive device, distance from the explosion, and information about the construction type of 
the building. In addition, the extent of injuries can be correlated with the structural damage patterns. 
Certain types of construction are highly blast resistant while some others are not. Damage is 
prevalent for wood construction even at large standoff distances, which is due to the inherent 
fragility of wood components to explosions. Conversely, reinforced concrete frames offer a high 
level of blast resistance, even though some infill panels between structural columns may be 
destroyed. The size of the structure relative to the bomb size is a significant factor in the amount of 
damage inflicted. A small, strong masonry building may withstand damage better that a large, two-
storey, lightly reinforced concrete building. 
 
Damage to various building types can be calculated based on computer simulations and existing 
blast damage assessment tools such as P-I diagrams for various structural elements (FACEDAP, 
1994). One example of blast damage prediction for a typical steel pre-engineered building is given 
in Table 2 (UG-2031-SHR, 1998). 
 
Distance for Specified Damage and Injury (m) Charge 
Weight 
 (kg) Minimal Minor Moderate Heavy Severe 
25 26 21 16 11 6 
100 50 40 31 25 16 
225 76 61 50 40 27 
450 116 90 70 59 44 
1,800 238 189 143 122 91 
18,000 747 625 433 372 229 
 
Table 2. Pre-engineered Steel Building (one-storey, pre-engineered steel, 6 metres by 24 metres, 
steel frames at 6 metres, corrugated steel roof on purlins). 
 
3. Methodology for protective design of buildings 
 
The methods for protecting buildings against explosions have been in existence for several 
decades. The design guidelines have been produced, particularly for high-risk projects such as 
military facilities and embassies. In response to a potential threat of terrorist bombing attacks 
and following the events of September 11, 2001, the private sector has became increasingly 
interested to examine whether design methodologies and construction techniques developed for 
military purposes could be beneficially applied to civilian structures. 
 
Many of the existing buildings have been designed and built with minimum consideration of 
protection against explosions. It is also unlikely that the building codes will fully incorporate blast 
resistant design requirements in the near future. Without change of policy and greater awareness 
among the engineering profession, new buildings will be designed and constructed in a similar 
fashion. 
 
It is agreed that the most effective way to protect a building against blast loads is to stop the 
attack before it occurs. If the attack does occur, the measures must be employed to ensure that 
the threat from explosions has minimal effect. This may be achieved by the implementation of a 
series of redundant physical and operational security measures as well as through achieving 
protection during the design stage. Considerations should be given how to: 
• Minimise the likelihood and magnitude of attack by making the building an unappealing 
target. 
• Prevent catastrophic collapse of the building to save lives; the collapse is inevitable but must 
be local. 
• Protect the people and assets from the primary and secondary effects of explosion (air-blast 
pressure, flying debris, etc). 
• Provide shelter to the occupants of the building during an explosion and facilitate rescue and 
evacuation efforts. 
• Enable rescue and repair efforts to be performed after an attack. 
 
A flowchart showing the methodology for protecting buildings against explosions is shown in 
Figure 4. The flowchart presents the sequence of activities such that an effective approach for 
protecting people, property and the business can be achieved. 
 
Building type and dimensions
Perform threat assessment 
Is protective 
design required?
Provide preventive measures 
(standoff, streetscape elements)
Explosion scenario (method of 
delivery, charge, distance)  
Calculate blast overpressure 
and loads (charts, software) 
Analysis of building response to 
blast effects (SDOF, charts, 
computer simulation) 
Blast damage assessment 
(p-i diagrams, ductility) 




Carry out detailed design 









Figure 4   Flowchart of the methodology for protective design of buildings 
3.1 Protective measures for buildings – defence in depth 
 
Defence in depth is to provide several layers that attackers must breach before reaching the 
protected facility. The concept is similar to peeling away successive layers of an onion to reach the 
centre. The use of standoff distance as a defensive tool may be the most cost effective option, since 
shock wave pressure decreases by a factor of 8, each time the standoff distance is doubled. To 
create a protected space for the critical facilities, barriers will need to be erected to form a 
perimeter. Entry into the protected area will be through controlled entry points. The main focus will 
be to limit the vehicular traffic in and out of the protected area. 
 
Orientation and building layout is also key in defence in depth. Two defensive issues should be 
addressed: (a) denying the attackers a straight or direct route to the critical structure; and (b) 
denying the attackers a clear line of sight to the critical structure. The first issue can be achieved by 
building routes that require vehicles to reduce their speed or prevent acceleration and therefore 
preventing use of their vehicle as ram. This can be accomplished with multiple turns or points 
where vehicles must stop. 
 
3.1.1 Maximise standoff distance 
 
Maximising the standoff distance keeps the threat as far away from critical buildings as possible. It 
is the easiest and least costly method for achieving the appropriate level of protection to a critical 
structure. Many times, vulnerable buildings are located in urban areas where site conditions are 
tight. When standoff distance is not available, the structure needs to be hardened to give the same 
level of protection that it would have with a greater standoff. The best way to increase the distance 
between a potential bomb and the critical building is to provide a continuous line of security along 
the perimeter of the facility to keep all vehicles as far away from critical assets as possible. The area 
within the standoff distance can be further partitioned (see Figure 5). The exclusive standoff zone 
provides a higher level of protection. Using the concept that vehicles are able to carry significantly 
more explosives than a person with a hand carry packages, the exclusive zone would be limited to 
pedestrian traffic only. The non-exclusive zone standoff zone would permit entry and parking of 




Figure 5   Exclusive and non-exclusive standoff zones (US Air Force, 1996) 
 
The U.S. Department of Defence minimum standard for effective standoff distance for primary 
gathering buildings is 25 metres away from parking and roadways without a controlled perimeter, 
but is reduced to 10 metres for the same facilities inside a controlled perimeter (UFC-4-010-01, 
2002). This is based on the assumption of a stationary vehicle bomb attack and the facilities are 
constructed of reinforced concrete or reinforced masonry. If the buildings were of light-weight 
construction such as a metal pre-engineered building, then the standoff distances would need to be 
increased. 
 
3.1.2 Physical protective barriers 
 
There are two categories of anti-ram barriers – passive (or fixed) vehicle barriers and active (or 
operable) vehicle barriers. These components enclose the standoff zone. Passive vehicle barriers are 
placed along the perimeter of the standoff zone where approach by land vehicle is possible. These 
barriers have no moving parts and are in a continuous “ready” state all the time. The majority of 
these are constructed in place. 
 
Vehicle barriers are rated based on the kinetic energy resisted. The kinetic energy resistance 
measures the capacity of a barrier to stop a vehicle of a particular gross weight at a given velocity. 
The barrier rating is typically determined through crash testing of full-scale barriers but may also be 
determined through detailed structural analysis. 
 
Figure 6(a) contains typical details for concrete planters. To be considered anchored, the planter 
must be embedded at least 0.5m into the foundation material. The traditional anti-ram solution is to 
use bollards (see Figure 6(b)). Bollards are concrete-filled steel pipes that are placed using about 
0.5m spacing along the curb to prevent vehicle intrusion. In order for them to provide resistance to 
impact of a vehicle, the bollards need to be embedded into a concrete footing that is about 1.0-1.5m 
deep. The height of planters and bollards should be as high as a car or truck bumper. An alternative 
to a bollard is an anti-ram knee wall constructed of reinforced concrete with a buried foundation. 
The wall may be fashioned into a base for a fence or the wall for a planter. The foundation of the 
bollard and knee-wall system can present challenges. Unless the foundation can sustain the reaction 
forces, significant damage may occur. 
 
 
Figure 6   Passive barriers: (a) concrete planters construction; (b) bollards construction (US Army, 
1994). 
 
3.2 Preventing progressive collapse 
 
Provisions in the applicable building codes do not give explicit requirements for the consideration 
of blast and progressive collapse resistance, except for general statements about structural 
redundancy, resilience and robustness. Because of the catastrophic consequences of progressive 
collapse, it is prudent to include measures of mitigating the effects of progressive collapse into the 
overall building design and give them the highest priority during the design process. Some issues 
related to structural protection measures to mitigate damage due to progressive collapse are 
summarised in a concise form below (US Dept of State, 1995): 
• Buildings should be designed against progressive collapse using the indirect method, the 
alternate-load-path method, or the specific local-resistance method. 
• Structural damage without collapse of the building is an acceptable and practical design 
parameter. 
• Consider incorporating internal damping into the structural system to absorb the blast impact. 
• Design floor systems for uplift in exterior bays that may pose a hazard to occupants. 
• Symmetric reinforcement can increase the ultimate load capacity of the structure. 
• Ductile details should be used for structural components to absorb the energy of a blast. 
•  Use two-way floor and roof systems. 
• Avoid the use of masonry when blast is the threat. Masonry walls break up readily and 
become secondary fragments during blasts. 




This paper has introduced several concepts that can be useful to structural engineers, building 
owners, and site planners in mitigating the threat of hazards resulting from terrorist attacks using an 
explosive-laden vehicle on new and existing buildings. The general properties of a bomb blast, the 
concept of defence in depth for an urban planning layout, the blast barriers, and preventing 
progressive collapse of a structure have been reviewed. The state-of-the-art methods to enhance 
protection of the building by incorporating low-cost measures at the early stages of building design 
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